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II. REPLY ARGUMENT 
A. The Reservation of the ACHD Proceeds Provision in the Addendum Did Not Restrain 
Respondents' Right of Alienation of the Property. 
Respondents contend that the district court correctly applied the doctrine of merger 
concerning the ACHD proceeds provision expressed in the Addendum because the amount of 
land to be acquired by ACHD and the amount of compensation to be paid were essential 
elements to "the right of alienation of real property" which "inheres to the very subject matter 
with which a warranty deed deals" and to which the merger doctrine applies. See 
Respondents'/Cross Appellants' Brief, p. 13, ~ 2. Because the warranty deed executed in this 
matter was silent to those issues, the real estate land contract merged with the deed. 
To be clear for the record, prior to the execution of the Commercial/Investment Real 
Estate Purchase and Sale Agreement executed by Confluence Management and Callister, ACHD 
extended the Fullers the same offer amount ($83,921.00) that Liberty Partners converted for 
itself. The Fullers disagreed with this amount presented in the appraisal report obtained by 
ACHD. Tr., p. 39, Ll. 2-22. 
In defining what constitutes a restraint on the alienation of property, this Court has 
approvingly cited to the definition provided in the Restatement of Property, specifically: 
Restatement of Property § 404 (1944), defines a restraint on alienation as follows: 
'(1) A restraint on alienation, as that phrase is used in this Restatement, is an 
attempt by an otherwise effective conveyance or contract to cause a later 
conveyance 
(a) to be void; or 
(b) to impose contractual liability on the one who makes the later 
conveyance when such liability results from a breach of an agreement not 
to convey; or 
(c) to terminate or subject to termination all or a part of the property 
interest conveyed.' 
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Lake v. Equitable Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 105 Idaho 923, 925, 674 P.2d 419,421 (1983). 
In Lake, this Court addressed whether a due-on-sale clause contained in a Deed of Trust 
which allowed a lender to declare the entire balance owed on a loan immediately due and 
payable if the property securing the loan was sold or otherwise transferred constituted a direct or 
indirect restraint on the alienation of real property. 
After accepting the definition provided in the Restatement and comments made by courts 
from other jurisdictions on the issue, this Court held that the due-on-sale was not a direct or 
indirect restraint on the alienation of real property. "Therefore, we decline to follow the 
Wellenkamp decision and, instead hold that even though the due-on-sale clause may affect the 
ease with which one may dispose of one's property as a matter of law, the due-on-sale clause is 
neither direct nor indirect restraint on alienation and therefore, is not void as such." 105 Idaho at 
926-927, 674 P.2d at 422-23. 
Additionally, the Lakes argued that the clause was unconscionable and against public 
policy. The Lake Court responded to this argument as follows: 
This Court has stated that' [a]n agreement voluntarily made between competent 
persons is not likely to be set aside on public policy grounds.' (Citation 
omitted). It has also been stated that public policy should not be allowed to curtail 
the liberty to contract unless the preservation of the general public welfare 
demands it. (Citation omitted). 105 Idaho at 927,674 P.2d at 423. (Emphasis 
added). 
The district court's determination that the uncertainty regarding the amount of land to be 
acquired and paid for by ACHD (a third party government entity with the power of eminent 
domain) restrained the Respondents ability to alienate or convey the real property to another fails 
under the definition expressed under the Restatement of Property and relied on by the Lake 
Court. 
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First, the reservation of the ACHD proceeds provided in the real estate contract and 
addendum would not render the conveyance to Respondents void if there was a later conveyance. 
Secondly, the real estate contract did not provide a condition not to convey which would 
have imposed liability on Respondents if they later conveyed the property. 
And finally, a later conveyance by Respondents would not have terminated the property 
interest conveyed under the contract with Fullers. 
As expressed above, the criteria set forth under the Restatement defining a "restraint on 
alienation" of real property would not have been triggered under the Commercial/Investment 
Real Estate Purchase and Sale Agreement and Addendum executed between Confluence 
Management, Callister and Fullers. The district court's conclusion that the doctrine of merger 
applied to the ACHD proceeds provision because the provision impacted the right of alienation 
of real property is erroneous based upon the definition adopted by the Lake Court. 
Respondents argue that in order to have an enforceable land sale contract, essential 
elements that must be present include: (1) identification of the parties involved, (2) identification 
of the subject matter of the contract, (3) the price or consideration, (4) a legal description of the 
property and (5) all the essential terms necessary in any particular situation that are required to 
form an enforceable agreement. P.o. Ventures v. Loucks Family Irrevocable Trust, 144 Idaho 
233,238, 159 P.3d 870, 875 (2007). (Emphasis added). The Fullers do not dispute that the 
foregoing elements are essential to create an enforceable land sale contract which is not at issue 
in this case. The district court's Memorandum Decision and Order held that purchase and sale 
agreement and addendum was a valid and enforceable contract. 
Notwithstanding, it appears from the Respondents' argument that the reservation of the 
ACHD proceeds provision provided in the Addendum was an essential element for an 
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enforceable contract which automatically merges into the deed. The Respondents simply fail to 
acknowledge that the provision in the Addendum reserving the ACHD proceeds was part of the 
consideration the parties agreed to in order to consummate the deal. The reservation of the 
ACHD proceeds for the benefit of the Fullers plus the payment of $1,273,000.00 was the 
consideration ofthe agreement. The Respondents ignore the recognized exception to the merger 
doctrine under Idaho law. 
In Milu, Inc. v. Duke, 204 So.2d 31 (1967), the Florida Court of Appeals for the Third 
District held that consideration to be paid in a contract did not merge with the deed. The Florida 
Court stated: 
It is a general rule that preliminary agreements and understandings relative to the 
sale of property usually merge in the deed executed pursuant thereto. (Citation 
omitted). However, there are exceptions to the merger rule. The rule that 
acceptance of a deed tendered in performance of a contract to convey land merges 
or extinguishes the covenants and stipulations contained in the contract does not 
apply to provisions of the antecedent contract which the parties do not intend to 
be incorporated in the deed, or which are not necessarily performed or satisfied by 
the execution and delivery of the stipulated conveyance. Contractual provisions 
as to considerations to be paid by the purchaser are ordinarily not merged in 
the deed and, accordingly, evidence of such contractual provisions is 
admissible to show what consideration is to be paid by the purchaser 
although the deed has been accepted. 55 Am.Jur., Vendor and Purchaser, Sec. 
328; American Law of Property (1952 ed.), Vol. III, Sec. 11.65; Thompson on 
Real Property, Vol. 8A, Sec. 4458. 204 So.2d at 33. (Emphasis added). 
In Purbaugh v. Jugensmeier, 483 N.W.2d 757 (1992), the Nebraska Supreme Court 
explained the following as it related to the doctrine of merger: 
'Merger' does not serve to make the contract and the deed one document; it 
is merely a rule for resolution of title disputes. '''' "[U]pon the execution, 
delivery, and acceptance of an unambiguous deed, such being the final acts of the 
parties expressing the terms of their agreement with reference to the subject 
matter, all prior negotiations and agreements are deemed merged therein ... " , " 
, (Citation omitted). '[T]herafter the deed regulates the rights and liabilities of 
the parties, and evidence of contemporaneous or antecedent agreements between 
the parties is inadmissible to vary or contract the terms of the deed." (Emphasis 
supplied. (Citation omitted). The doctrine of merger 'does not apply to those 
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provisions of the antecedent contract which the parties do not intend to be 
incorporated in the deed, or which are not necessarily performed or satisfied 
by the execution and delivery ofthe stipulated conveyance.' (Citation 
omitted). For example, ' [ a] stipulation in a preliminary contract for the sale of 
real estate, to deliver a deed at a specified time upon a contingency fully 
performed, does not necessarily merge in a subsequently delivered and accepted 
deed.' (Citation omitted). 
The doctrine of merger does not serve to make the contract and the deed one. 
Absent fraud or mistake, the deed controls as to the identity of the estate. 
(Citations omitted). Terms such as purchase price, interest, payments, and 
date of closing included within the contract of sale are normally not repeated 
in the deed and therefore are not merged with the deed instrument. 483 
N.W.2d at 761-62. (Emphasis added). See also, McGovern Builders, Inc. v. 
Davis, 468 N.E.2d 90 (1983). 
The doctrine of merger is an evidentiary rule akin to the parole evidence rule. In the 
absence of fraud or relievable mistake, express or implied provisions in a contract with respect to 
title of land are merged in the accepted deed, and evidence of such contractual provisions is 
inadmissible to vary or contradict the deed with respect to title. l 77 Am.Jur.2d, Vendor and 
Purchaser, Sec. 243 (2006). The Nebraska Supreme Court's comments regarding the merger 
doctrine as a rule for resolving title disputes is consistent with the holding in Jolley v. Idaho Sec., 
Inc., 90 Idaho 373, 414 P.2d 879 (1966). The Jolley Court acknowledged the Court previously 
considered the general rule and its recognized exceptions to the merger doctrine in its previous 
decision in Christiansen v. Intermountain Assn., 46 Idaho 394, 267 P. 1074 (1928). Relying on 
the Christiansen decision, the Jolley Court quoted the following statements regarding the merger 
doctrine and its exceptions: 
'To the general rule that there is a merger of prior covenants and agreements in 
the deed, there is a well recognized exception. Where the covenants in the 
contract do not relate to the conveyance, but are collateral to and 
independent of the conveyance, they are not merged in the deed, in so far as 
the deed is only a part performance of the contract. (citations) 
I The foregoing proposition expressed in American Jurisprudence cites Jolley v. Idaho Sec., Inc., 90 Idaho 373, 414 
P.2d 879 (1966) in support thereof. 
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'A grantee may accept a deed as full performance of a prior contract, even where 
it is not such; but whether a deed has been so accepted is, in the final analysis, a 
matter of intention. It would seem that where the covenants are of this nature 
- that is, collateral to the covenants of conveyance - there is no presumption 
that either party intended to give up the benefit of the covenants of which the 
conveyance is not a performance. (citations). In such a case the contract is 
kept alive, and an action on it may be brought in case of its breach, 
independent of any possible recovery on the warranties of the deed. 
Id, 90 Idaho at 384, 414 P.2d at 885. (Emphasis added). 
The reservation of the ACHD proceeds provided in the addendum that was agreed on by 
Confluence Management, Callister and Fullers reads: 
3. Seller to receive any and all funds paid for road right of way including land, 
landscaping, fencing, sprinklers and temporary easements. 
Escrow instructions by the title company will cover the receipt and 
disbursement of the right of way funds. It is understood that buyer will be 
deeding the right of way to ACHD and that the seller, Dave and Shirley Fuller 
will receive all of said funds paid by ACHD. Said amount has not been yet 
determined and Dave and Shirley Fuller retain the right to negotiate the amount 
with ACHD. 
See Exhibit B to the Affidavit of David Fuller which is attached to the record as Exhibit 2. See 
R. p. 76. (Emphasis added). 
The parties clearly understood and intended that the buyer (Confluence Management & 
Callister) would deed the land to ACHD for its right-of-way and that the Fullers would receive 
the funds paid by ACHD for said land for road right of way. The reservation ofthe ACHD 
proceeds did not, in any way, relate to the conveyance ofthe real estate between the Fullers and 
the Respondents. The Fullers conveyed and Liberty Partners received, through its assignment 
with Confluence Management, fee simple title to all 12.73 acres owned by the Fullers. 
Furthermore, the reservation of the ACHD proceeds in the addendum did not relate to the 
title of the real property conveyed by Fullers to Respondents. Liberty Partners, through its 
assignment with Confluence Management, received full fee simple title to all 12.73 acres 
previously owned by the Fullers. 
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Neither Jolley nor Sells v. Robinson, 141 Idaho 767, 118 P.3d 99 (2005) which the 
district court relied on reference or mention the "right of alienation" as a presumption for the 
application of the doctrine of merger. 
"Alienation" is defined as: 
In real property law, the transfer of the property and possession of lands, 
tenements, or other things, from one person to another. The term is particularly 
applied to absolute conveyances of real property. The voluntary and complete 
transfer from one person to another. Disposition by will. Every mode of passing 
realty by the act of the party, as distinguished from passing it by the operation of 
law. Black's Law Dictionary, 6th Ed., p. 72 (1990). 
What the Respondents simply fail to acknowledge and the district court neglected is that 
all real property is subject to the government's power of eminent domain. See, Portneuf 
Irrigating Co. v. Budge, 16 Idaho 116, 126, 100 P. 1046, 1049 (1909) ("The power of eminent 
domain is an inalienable right of sovereignty (Hollister v. State, 9 Ida. 8, 71 Pac. 541 (1903); 
Lewis on Eminent Domain, secs. 1-3), and may be exercised over all the property within the 
state.). A landowner cannot prohibit the exercise of the power, unless the use to which the 
property is to be applied is not authorized by law, the taking is not necessary for such use, the 
appropriation is not for a public use, and payment of just compensation is not made. Idaho Code 
§ 7-704. 
The real estate contract between Fullers and Respondents in no way hindered or 
restrained Respondents and/or Liberty Partners' ability to transfer the property to another party. 
The event which would trigger the reservation provision in the agreement was dependent 
upon ACHD (a third party government agency) to acquire road right of way from the 
Respondents during their ownership of the property. The reservation language expressed in the 
addendum clearly acknowledged that this event was independent and collateral to the 
conveyance between the parties and a condition subsequent to the agreement: 
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It is understood that buyer will be deeding the right of way to ACHD and that 
the seller, Dave and Shirley Fuller will receive all of said funds paid by ACHD. 
(Emphasis added). 
Idaho law recognizes that contract rights that are collateral and independent of the deed 
which are to be performed subsequent to the conveyance are not presumed merged. See Jolley, 
supra. (the merger doctrine did not apply to obtaining an abstract of title after the conveyance). 
For additional guidance, the Fullers refer this Court to the Minnesota Supreme Court's decision 
in Bruggeman v. Jerry's Enterprise, Inc., 591 N.W.2d 705 (1999). 
In Bruggeman, the Minnesota Supreme Court reviewed its Court of Appeals decision 
reversing the district court's granting of summary judgment to the purchaser on the grounds that 
the doctrine of merger applied to the repurchase option agreement. 
The relevant facts on the issue was that the seller reserved an option in the real estate 
agreement to repurchase the subject property within two (2) years if the Buyer had not 
commenced construction of improvements on the property. See id., 591 N.W.2d at 706. 
On review, the Court reviewed the history of the merger doctrine as it applied in 
Minnesota. The Court noted that it opinions relating to the doctrine were generally limited to 
recitations of the general rule that all prior agreements were deemed to have merged into the 
deed. However, the Court acknowledged that its prior decisions did not address the pending 
issue on appeal. "Because of the nature of the issues before us on those occasions, it has not 
been necessary to discuss the possibility that agreements pertaining to conditions subsequent 
might not merge with the deed at closing." Id., 591 N.W.2d at 709. 
On review concerning the issue pending, the Court explained as follows: 
We therefore look for guidance from jurisdictions that have answered the 
question. When considered as a whole, the foreign case law on the merger 
doctrine indicates that the rule 'is not as broad or absolute as some abbreviated 
statements of the doctrine might indicate.' 77 Am.Jur.2d, Vendor and Purchaser 
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§ 289 (1997). Many states have carved out exceptions to the general presumption 
of merger for those situations in which the parties to a real estate transaction 
would be unlikely to have intended that their contractual agreements be 
extinguished by a subsequent deed of conveyance. In 1988, the Mississippi 
Supreme Court surveyed the state of merger doctrine law as it has developed in 
the states, and conclude that 'thirty-seven (37) jurisdictions hold collateral or 
independent agreements, which are to be perfonned subsequent to the 
conveyance, are not merged into the deed of conveyance.' Knight v. McCain, 
531 So.2d 590, 595 (Miss. 1988). Minnesota was one of eleven states that had not 
addressed the issue.2 (Citation omitted). 
The courts that have carved out an exception from the merger doctrine for 
conditions subsequent use the exception as a means of giving meaning to the 
parties' presumed intentions that the agreement survive conveyance of deed. As 
one commentator explained: 
The idea behind the distinction is this: If the promise is contemplated by 
the contract to be perfonned at closing and it is not so perfonned, then there is 
some reason to infer that the parties intended that the agreed-upon perfonnance 
not be required and that the promise has thereby accepted a substitute 
perfonnance. On the other hand, if the promise is by its nature not perfonnable 
until some time after closing, then there is no particular reason to infer that the 
promise has agreed to abandon the right of performance, from the mere fact that 
the undertaking has not been repeated in the deed or other closing papers. 
(Citation omitted). 
We agree that there is no reason to presume that a party has waived its right to 
perfonnance of a contractual obligation that cannot be perfonned until sometime 
after the closing simply by accepting a deed that does not contain a reference to 
that prior agreement. Because there is no reason that waiver should be 
automatically presumed in these circumstances, we do not feel it would be 
equitable to apply a rule that inflexibly assumes that the parties intended waiver, 
thereby denying parties any chance to pursue their claim in court. We therefore 
hold that the presumption of merger does not apply to this repurchase option 
agreement which could not, by its very nature, be perfonned prior to closing. Id., 
591 N.W.2d at 709-10. 
In Peterson v. Peterson, 431 So.2d 672 (1983), the Florida Court of Appeal of the Third 
District addressed whether reserving a life estate in a real estate agreement survived the merger 
doctrine. The Florida Court recited: 
2 Jolley, supra., was one of the cases identified by the Mississippi Supreme Court of the 37 states that held that 
collateral or independent agreements which were to performed subsequent to the conveyance were not merged into 
the deed. 531 So.2d at 595. 
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An agreement, as her, made contemporaneously with a deed so as to show 
consideration for a promise to reconvey the property upon a certain stated 
condition, is valid. (Citation omitted). Where an agreement is collateral to, or 
independent of, the provisions of the deed, there is no merger. (Citations 
omitted). Here the agreement by its very terms reflect the intent of the parties that 
it be independent of the deed. (Citation omitted). Moreover, the agreement, 
again by its very terms, could not become effective until after the delivery of the 
deed, since prior to that time Jack would have no life estate to forfeit by ceasing 
to occupy the property. (Citation omitted). Id., 431 So.2d at 673. 
Although this Court is not faced with the per se issue concerning the reservation of a 
repurchase agreement or life estate in a contract surviving the merger doctrine, the reasoning, 
rational and proposition adopted by these jurisdictions, as well as, the cases cited in Fullers 
original brief are consistent with Idaho law. Although not binding, on an issue of first 
impression, this Court will look at decisions from other jurisdictions to provide guidance on the 
Issue. Sliman v. Aluminum Co. of America, 112 Idaho 277, 281, 731 P.2d 1267, 1270 (1986). 
Clearly, the intent of the parties reflected in the reservation was independent to the 
conveyance of the property. The parties agreed and understood that the reservation for the 
ACHD proceeds in the addendum would take place after closing, otherwise how could have 
Respondents legally deed the right of way to ACHD prior to closing since they would had no 
legal interest or title to the property. Furthermore, if the parties intended Fullers to complete a 
deal with ACHD prior to dosing, there would have been no need to include the provision in the 
first place that required Respondents to convey the right of way to ACHD. 
In this matter, the reservation of the ACHD proceeds was part ofthe consideration for the 
agreement which is collateral or independent of the conveyance of the deed and the obligation 
could not be performed until after the conveyance was completed. 
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Based upon the district court's erroneous conclusion that the reservation of the ACHD 
proceeds restrained the right of alienation to which the merger doctrine applied, the case 
authority provided herein and previously, Jolley's acknowledgment that a contract right which is 
both a condition subsequent and collateral to the conveyance of a deed does not merge with the 
deed, and the unequivocal facts reflecting the parties' intent that the obligation arising under the 
reservation of the ACHD proceeds would not be performed until after closing, the Fullers' 
respectfully request this Court enter its order reversing the district court's ruling that the doctrine 
of merger applied to the reservation at issue. 
B. The Assignment of the Purchase and Sale Agreement to Liberty Partners Did Not Relieve 
Confluence Management of Liability under the Agreement. 
Respondents argue that the assignment between Confluence Management and Liberty 
Partners, with the Fullers consent, relieved Confluence Management of any further obligations 
and liabilities imposed under the contract because all its rights and responsibilities were 
transferred to Liberty Partners. Because the assignment was valid, it was not necessary for the 
district court to reach the question of novation. 
Although Confluence Management assigned its rights to Liberty Partners creating privity 
between them, the assignment did not extinguish the rights, obligations and privity between 
Confluence Management, Callister and the Fullers created under the original and underlying real 
estate contract. 
The real estate agreement identified the buyer as "Confluence Management and/or 
assigns" which was signed by Callister, not as a member of Confluence Management or in an 
official capacity of the unknown "assigns" at the time, but rather, personally. R., Vol. I, p. 76, 
Aff. of David Fuller, Exhibits A & B. 
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The real estate purchase and sale agreement and addendum were executed on September 
20, 2005 and two (2) days later, the parties closed on the sale. At no time prior to the execution 
of the underlying agreement were the Fullers informed or advised that Callister was intending to 
transfer the property to another entity he owned. A significant fact in this case is that Callister, 
Confluence Management and Liberty Partners are in essence one and the same. Certainly, 
Liberty Partners cannot assert that it was a bona fide purchaser of the property and unaware of 
the reservation of the ACHD proceeds under the agreement it was assigned. Respondents appear 
to suggest that the identification of the buyer under the agreement which included "and/or 
assigns" created some form of privity between the unknown assigns, at the time, and the Fullers. 
This is not so. 
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 323 (1981) entitled "Obligor's Assent to 
Assignment or Delegation" states under the comments, in relevant parts, the following: 
b. Promises to or by "assigns." Contracts often refer to the "assigns" of one or 
both parties. A purported promise by a promisor "and his assigns" does not mean 
that the promisor can terminate his duty by making an assignment, nor does it of 
itself show an assumption of duties by any assignee ... 
c. Assent subsequent to contract. . .. Assent to assignment and delegation, even 
though irrevocable, does not of itself establish a novation discharging duties of 
the assignor. 
The assignment, at issue and presented on the day of closing, expressed: 
The undersigned sellers and buyers agree to the following: 
1. The buyers of said property will be assigned to vest as Liberty Partners, Inc. 
All other terms and conditions shall remain the same. 
R., Vol. I, p. 76, Aff. of David Fuller, Exhibit C. 
The assignment simply assumes that the title of the property will be under Liberty 
Partners. Even assuming that the assignment is a complete transfer of rights under the contract 
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between Confluence Management and Liberty Partners, it unquestionably does not express an 
extinguishment of the right and obligations under the contract between Confluence Management, 
Callister and the Fullers. 
The Respondents argue that the payment of $1,273,000.00 to the Fullers for the property 
was the principal obligation and fully performed, therefore there is no other debt obligation. See 
Respondents'/Cross-Appellants' Brief, p. 23. Contrary to Respondents' assertion, the debt 
obligation and consideration in the contract was $1,273,000 and the proceeds from ACHD. 
The Respondents imply that consent, alone, is sufficient to create a novation in a real 
estate sale transaction, and that the Idaho authority and other jurisdictions cited by the Fullers in 
their previous brief on the subject is applicable only to areas of law on leases and debtor/creditor 
relationships where consent, alone, is not sufficient to create a novation. See id. No such 
distinction exists under Idaho law or any other jurisdiction. There is a clear distinction between 
an "assignment" and a "novation" under Idaho law, in that, an assignment transfers rights and 
obligations between parties while a novation extinguishes rights and obligations between parties. 
In order to create a novation arising by an assignment, the parties' intent must be clearly 
established and expressed, consent alone to the assignment is not enough. Warm Springs Dev. 
Assoc. v. Burrows, 120 Idaho 280, 284, 815 P.2d 478, 482 (App.1991). Without an express 
novation, the original contracting party remains in privity of contract and is a guarantor for the 
performance of the covenants in the agreement. See id.; see also, George W Watkins Family v. 
Messenger, 115 Idaho 386, 766 P.2d 1267 (App.1988) 
The Fullers do not challenge the district court's finding that Confluence Management 
assigned its rights to Liberty Partners. However, the district court's holding thereafter that no 
contractual obligations continue to exist between Confluence Management and the Fullers 
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resulting from the assignment is contrary to the law in Idaho. There is nothing in the record, but 
for the assignment, alone, that supports an express novation was created between Confluence 
Management and the Fullers. The assignment, alone, speaks for itself to the issue. 
Furthermore, there is nothing in the record that shows Liberty Partners assumed 
Confluence Management's debt obligation owed to the Fullers. 
Finally, Respondents argue that certain conditions precedent under the contract were 
supposedly not performed and thus this somehow extinguishes Confluence Managements' 
obligation for tendering the ACHD proceeds provided in the contract. This argument has no 
merit. 
First, the reservation of the ACHD proceeds was not a condition precedent, but by its 
very terms was a condition subsequent, thus the boilerplate provision of paragraph lOin the 
agreement is not applicable, and if so, the parties were excused for nonperformance according to 
the language. 
Second, Respondents argument that "the fact that Liberty Partners held the property deed 
eliminated any further possibility that Confluence Management would be required to perform 
under the contract because it would not receive the ACHD proceeds" does not relieve 
Confluence Management under the agreement because, if liable, Confluence Management would 
have a direct claim against Liberty Partners for indemnification. See Respondents' /Cross-
Appellants' Brief, p. 26. 
Based upon the foregoing case law, arguments and undisputed facts, the Fullers 
respectfully request this Court enter its order reversing the district court's ruling denying 
dismissal of Respondents' eighth affirmative defense of novation. 
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C. The District Court's Dismissal Respondent Callister, individually, Should be Reversed. 
Although the Fullers did not raise any issue concerning Callister's individual liability in 
their motion for partial summary judgment, the district court sua sponte concluded that dismissal 
was warranted because of its findings that the doctrine of merger applied and the contract was 
assigned to Liberty Partners extinguishing any liability arising under the contract to confluence 
Management. 
Fullers again reiterate that if this Court finds that the doctrine of merger was applicable to 
the reservation of the ACHD proceeds and affirms the district court's ruling, then this issue of 
error is moot. 
Notwithstanding, and should this Court reverse the district court's decision, there is 
evidence in the record creating a material issue of disputed fact which precludes a summary 
judgment dismissing Callister, individually. 
As noted above, the real estate contract identified the buyer as "Confluence Management 
and/or assigns" and it was signed by Callister who did not designate under whose capacity he 
was executing the contract for. See R., Vol. I, p. 76, Aff. of David Fuller, Exhibits A & B. 
A reasonable inference in favor of the Fullers can be drawn that Callister knew at all 
times that he was intending to transfer the property to his corporation, Liberty Partners, and he 
failed to disclose his relationship of the principal he was truly acting for. 
In Western Seeds, Inc. v. Bartu, 109 Idaho 70, 704 P.2d 974 (App.1985), the Idaho Court 
of Appeals held that an agent who contracts with someone and fails or partially discloses the 
agency relationship and identity of the principal for whom he is representing is personally liable 
as a party to the contract. 
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In vacating the dismissal of the agent, individually, the Idaho Court of Appeals 
articulated the following: 
We believe the trial court erred by dismissing Western Seeds' complaint against 
Bartu. An agent contracting with someone else is liable as a party to the 
contract unless he discloses, at or before the time entering into the contract, 
the agency relationship and the identity of the principal. (Citations omitted). 
Similarly, a person contracting with another for a partially disclosed 
principal is liable to the contract. (Citations omitted). The evidence indicated, 
as noted by the district court in its memorandum opinion, that Western Seeds did 
not learn until after it stopped delivering seed that Farmers Feed and Seed was 
owned by Pocatello Cold Storage. The trial court erroneously assumed that 
partial disclosure of a principal - here, the fact that Bartu was contracting on 
behalf of a corporation, although the corporate name was not disclosed - would 
be sufficient to relieve the agent from liability on the contract. The factual 
question - whether Western Seeds knew of the relationship between Farmers 
Feed and Seed and Pocatello Cold Storage, Inc. before part or all of the open 
account debt was incurred - was not resolved by the trial court, because of the 
court's erroneous assumption. Nor is the answer to that factual question obvious 
from the record. (Citation omitted). We therefore remand this case to the district 
court to make a finding regarding disclosure of the identity of the principal, before 
determining whether the agent should be relieved from liability for the account. 
Id, 109 Idaho at 71-72, 704 P.2d at 975-76. (Emphasis added). 
Here, the district court's Memorandum Decision and Order found Callister was both a 
member of Confluence and the President of Liberty Partners. R., Vol. I, p. 62. The real estate 
agreement identified the buyer as "Confluence Management and/or assigns." See R., Vol. I, p. 
76, Aff. of David Fuller, Exhibits A & B. Two (2) days after the contract was executed, Callister 
assigns the contract to Liberty Partners. See id, Exhibit C. 
The first time the Fullers could have reasonably discovered Callister's relationship to and 
the actual principal who would be receiving the party was the day of closing, after the real estate 
agreement was accepted. In this case, Callister was representing and acting for two distinct legal 
entities in which he has a personal interest in both, but failed to disclose Liberty Partners who 
ultimately received title to the property. 
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Based upon the foregoing case law and the Clerk's Record, if this Court reverses the 
district court's ruling on the issues referenced above, specifically, the merger doctrine, then the 
district court's sua sponte ruling dismissing Callister, individually, should be reversed. 
D. Respondents/Cross-Appellants are not Entitled to Attorney Fees 
Under I.C. § 12-120(3). 
Respondents/Cross-Appellants argue the district court erred in not awarding their 
attorney fees under Idaho Code § 12-120(3) on the grounds that the real estate contract in the 
matter was intended for development purposes by Respondents and therefore the gravaman of 
the lawsuit was a "commercial transaction." See Respondents'/Cross-Appellants' Brief, p. 33. 
Respondents cite several cases issued by this Court which have held that commercial real estate 
development disputes have been deemed commercial transactions for purposes of an award of 
attorney fees under Idaho Code § 12-120(3). The Fullers does not dispute nor challenge the 
proposition that under certain circumstances commercial real estate development disputes can 
constitute a "commercial transaction" for purposes ofIdaho Code § 12-120(3). However, the 
gravaman of this case giving rise to this litigation did not concern a dispute of the sale of the 
property, but instead it concerned the enforcement of the provision which provided the Fullers 
the right to receive the ACHD proceeds which were converted by Liberty Partners for itself, a 
fact which is undisputed in this case. 
As noted by Respondents, the district court held: 
In the instant case, the transaction giving rise to the litigation was the purchase by 
Defendants of Plaintiffs' home. Plaintiffs sought to recover condemnation 
proceeds. That the Defendants may have purchased the property for commercial 
purposes is not integral to the claim or constitute the basis on which Plaintiffs 
were attempting to recover. The Court finds that this was not a commercial 
transaction. Plaintiffs' motion to disallow attorney fees is GRANTED. 
R., Vol. II, p. 63. 
APPELLANTS'/CROSS-RESPONDENTS' REPLY BRIEF - 20 
In support of its holding, the district court cited to this Court's decision in Sun Valley Hot 
Springs Ranch, Inc. v. Kelsey, 131 Idaho 657, 962 P .2d 1041 (1998) where this Court affirmed 
the district court's denial of attorney fees to the prevailing party under Idaho Code § 12-120(3) 
involving a dispute arising from a failed residential subdivision development. 
In Kelsey, the litigation was about whether a lot owner in an uncompleted residential 
subdivision development could enforce the CC&Rs against the new owners of the subdivision 
that acquired their interest after a foreclosure proceeding. Among the claims, the lot owner 
alleged that the new owners had an obligation pursuant to the subdivision's recorded plat and 
CC&Rs to complete construction of the subdivision and that they breached this obligation. The 
merits were decided by summary judgment for the new owners and the district court's ruling was 
affirmed by this Court, including the district court's denial for an award of attorneys fees under 
Idaho Code § 12-120(3) requested by the prevailing party. 
In affirming the denial on an award of attorney fees under said section, this Court 
explained: 
Idaho Code § 12-120(3) provides for an award of attorney fees to the prevailing 
party in a civil action to recover on any commercial transaction. "Commercial 
transactions," as defined in I.C. § 12-120(3), include all transactions except 
transactions for personal or household purposes. "Attorney's fees are not 
appropriate under I.C. § 12-120(3) unless the commercial transaction is integral to 
the claim, and constitutes the basis upon which the party is attempting to 
recover." Brower v. E.I Dupont De Nemours & Co.! 117 Idaho 780, 784, 792 
P.2d 345, 349 (1990). 
Kelsey and SLVM argue that the loan-mortgage transaction between First 
Federal and Clarendon and the sale of Lot 44 to the Davises are "commercial 
transactions" which are integral to SVHS' claims and constitute the basis upon 
which SVHS is attempting to recover. Accordingly, they claim the district court 
should have awarded them attorney fees under I.C. § 12-120(3) as the prevailing 
parties. 
This Court has previously recognized, however, that an "award of attorney's fees 
is not warranted [under I.C. § 12-120(3)] every time a commercial transaction is 
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remotely connected with the case." (Citation omitted). The commercial 
transaction must be integral to the plaintiff s claims and constitute the basis upon 
which the plaintiff is attempting to recover. (Citation omitted). While the loan-
mortgage transaction and the sale of Lot 44 are commercial transactions as 
defined in I.C. § 12-120(3), they are incidental to SVHS' claims. This action 
brought by SVHS is essentially an action whereby a landowner is attempting to 
enforce covenants against the owner of adjacent property. This case is analogous 
to holdings by this Court and the Court of Appeals involving determination of 
property rights. See Durrant v. Christensen, 117 Idaho 70, 785 P.2d 634 (1990) 
(action in which landowners sought adjudication of water rights and a permanent 
restraining order prohibiting defendant from interfering with their diversion and 
use of water determined not to be an action based on a commercial transaction as 
defined in I.C. § 12-120(3)); Chen v. Conway, 121 Idaho 1006,829 P.2d 1355 
(Ct.App.1991 ) (quiet title action involving dispute over the existence of a 
prescriptive easement determined not be a commercial transaction under LU 
12-120(3)); Jerry J Joseph c.L. U Ins. Assoc. v. Vaught, 117 Idaho 555, 789 P.2d 
1146 (Ct.App.1990) (attorney fees denied under I.C. § 12-120(3) in action where 
property owner sought judgment compelling adjoining property owners to 
reimburse it for irrigation assessments, to record an instrument establishing an 
access easement, and to remove a fence hindering its use of the easement and 
where after settlement, adjoining property owners breached the settlement 
agreement). The present action is primarily a property dispute to determine 
ownership and easement rights and does not fall within the meaning of a 
commercial transaction in I.C. § 12-120(3). Therefore, the district court properly 
denied Kelsey and SVLM's claim for attorney fees under this provision. Id., 131 
Idaho at 663, 962 P.2d at 1047. 
Similar to the foregoing case, the Fullers' claim is seeking to enforce a covenant in their 
contract with Respondents to recover the proceeds ACHD paid to Liberty Partners who 
intentionally refused to tum over the money to the Fullers. The Fullers claim is not about the 
sale and conveyance of the land to Respondents which they assume Respondents have since 
completed the construction of their development, it is about the money paid by ACHD which 
Respondents agreed that it would belong to the Fullers. Although the underlying sale of land 
may have been a "commercial transaction" as defined under I.C. § 12-120(3), the Fullers' claim 
is about a condition subsequent which could only be triggered if ACHD acquired land during 
their ownership, a fact that is not in dispute. 
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Accordingly, the Fullers respectfully request this Court to affirm the district court's 
denial of an award of attorney fees under I.C. § 12-120(3) to the Respondents. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Based upon the case authority provided herein and previously and the arguments 
presented, the Fuller's respectfully request this Court to reverse the district court's Memorandum 
Decision and Order with instructions that the Fullers are granted partial summary judgment for 
the dismissal of Respondents' eighth and ninth affirmative defenses as a matter of law and 
entitled to their attorney fees and costs on appeal as the prevailing party. 
A 
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